BUILDING RESILIENCE – THE NATO AND EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO BUILDING RESILIENCE

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Abstract

Resilience is "the ability of states and societies to reform themselves, thereby enduring and recovering from internal and external crises". Within the framework of the paper, the author analyzes the approach of the European Union to building resilience through the analysis of the Global Strategy of the European Union from 2016 and the strategy adopted for the period 2020 – 2025. In the final part, the author states several conclusions: resilience of NATO member states through maintaining and developing their individual and collective defense capacity – collective defense capacity is operationalized through NATO’s defense planning and capability development process; the conceptual scope of resilience is expanded to include the resilience of critical infrastructure and energy security as well as secure and resilient systems for ensuring the communication security of NATO countries; it should be a multifaceted strategy and a broad systemic perspective aimed at configuring the multiple risks of crises and at the same time improving the mechanisms for rapid involvement and adaptation of reactions, national and regional level; in relation to prevention, a resilience-based approach is needed which would identify and reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the effects of potential threats and which highlights the importance of the capabilities of actors implementing response and recovery actions.

The content will be created based on the analysis of foreign literature and using electronic content. In preparing the content of the paper, the author will apply the general scientific methods: the descriptive method, the normative method, the comparative method and the content analysis method as a special scientific method.

Keywords: building resilience, developing civil preparedness and military capacity, strengthening common awareness

1. INTRODUCTION

Europe today faces interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges which are exacerbated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity. Instability results in conflict-related violence, as well as attacks on cultural property and environmental damage. The proliferation of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organizations and enables destabilizing and coercive interference by strategic competitors. Taking into account the fact that modern threats have complex content, the need to respond to the entire society is also imposed. It implies the need to build national capacities to improve resistance to modern threats through a broader, more integrated and better-coordinated approach at the national level.
Building resilience is a long-term process that needs to be context-specific and embedded in national development policies and planning. In order to realize the protection of national interests and create national resilience of society, each country needs to build an effective concept for dealing with a series of challenges as well as defense against cyber and hybrid threats - each country should be able to adapt to the unpredictable, complex and a changing security environment. Strengthening resilience requires a long-term approach based on mitigating the root causes that contribute to crises and strengthening capacities to better manage future uncertainty and change.

2. ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TOWARDS BUILDING RESILIENCE


Key characteristics of the EU’s approach to resilience - As defined in the Communication "The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises", resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks (See more: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/food-security/documents/20121003-comm_en.pdf).

Resilience shall not be understood as an isolated objective but as an integral part of the poverty reduction and lifesaving aims of the EU’s external assistance. The EU’s broad definition of resilience includes the individual level, reflecting our commitment to people-centered approaches and the inclusion of individual (life-cycle) risks, which must be addressed if people are to exit poverty and vulnerability.

Country-owned and Country-led - It is primarily a national government’s responsibility to build resilience and to define political, economic, environmental and social priorities accordingly. Building resilience is a long-term process that needs to be context-appropriate and embedded in national policies and planning for development. Aligning humanitarian and development aid to national resilience strategies in each country is a precondition for sustainable results.

National strategies will require firm political commitments and accountability. They can also include institutional change and technical support, including in-country coordination mechanisms. It is ultimately individual countries’ responsibility to progress towards resilience, meeting key development standards (e.g. for food and nutrition, water, education, health, sanitation, social security).

It is necessary to identify a functional system within the existing local institutions and support for strengthening their capacities will be crucial in these situations. This will ensure that the sustainability agenda is rooted in the national context to the maximum extent possible. In parallel, efforts to build a state and develop capacities will continue to be supported.

Equity - a people-centered approach: The resilience approach must bring sustainable benefits to the most vulnerable populations and households, taking into account the diversity of needs of women, children, men and the elderly, who may suffer from multiple factors of vulnerability, living in areas most exposed to risks.

A resilience approach should contribute to increasing one's own capacity to absorb shocks and cope with stress and represents an opportunity for transformation in terms of adaptation to changing environments, empowerment, improved livelihoods and economic
opportunities. Achieving this ultimate goal will require action at various levels and dimensions, including conflict prevention, resolution and state-building.

Given the multi-faceted aspects of resilience building, actions must be sustainable, multi-sectoral, multi-level, multi-partner and strategically and jointly planned by the people affected or at risk, communities, governments (at the local, sub-national and national levels) and civil society. They should be supported by humanitarian and development assistance partners over the short, medium and long term. In this context, joint programming with the Member States has the potential to play a key role in supporting the resilience agenda.

Against this background, the EU has consistently supported prevention and preparedness for crises in the most vulnerable countries – e.g. by identifying the need to integrate DRR and Adaptation to Climate Change into crisis response/recovery actions, humanitarian response and development cooperation and by investing in fragility assessments, risk assessments and early warning systems – but coherence will be further promoted in the different policies and instruments dealing with resilience.

The action plan also sets priorities: EU support for the development and implementation of national resilience approaches integrated into the National Development Plans. The intention is to develop joint assessments, strategies and implementation plans to build resilience.

Resilience shall be understood, acknowledged and accepted, at the expert/technical level, as well as at the political decision-making level. European Union support at the regional level will strengthen the capacity of regional organizations and stakeholders to strengthen the integration of resilience into the planning of EU regional financial instruments and support regional capacities to identify, assess and monitor risk by improving analytical tools. EU interventions in areas such as food and nutrition security, climate change, DRR, agriculture, health, education and social protection, peace building and the building of the state, contribute to building resilience as a basic political priority.

Innovation, learning and advocacy - a common understanding of resilience objectives is required by governments and international partners.

The Action Plan acknowledges that new approaches are needed to build resilience. Innovation will be supported, as will collaboration with new partners at all levels and in particular EU Member States, other bilateral and multilateral donors, local authorities, civil society, and the private sector. New resilience approaches will be tested in differing regions, differing environments and scales. Innovative approaches will seek to address known gaps and areas of concern with risk management and humanitarian assistance.

Methodologies and tools to support resilience including EU procedures and mechanisms, supporting the Commission, the EEAS, the EU Delegations, as well as all relevant stakeholders apply the approach, monitor, build the evidence base and learn from best practice.

An immediate priority is to develop relevant tools and guidance to assist EU actors in implementing its resilience-related commitments. An immediate priority is to develop relevant tools and guidance to assist EU actors in implementing its resilience-related commitments. Finally, it is stated that guidelines for the implementation of the European Union’s approach to resilience will be prepared and training organized for the Commission, the EEAS and Member States’ staff, as well as partners.
2.1. Building resilience according global strategy of the European Union from 2016


This strategy in the field of foreign and security policy establishes five priorities that will shape the foreign policy action of the European Union in the future (Gerginova, 2018).

▪ Work will be done on strengthening capacities and investing in projects in the field of defense, "cyber" space, counter-terrorism, energy communications;
▪ Resilience of the states and communities east and south of the EU – it is in the interest of EU citizens to invest in the resilience of the states and communities as far as Central Asia and Central Africa;
▪ Integrated approach to conflicts – the European Union will act in all phases of the conflict cycle; will act with the preventive component; will react responsibly and decisively to crises; it will intervene in stabilization and when new crises break out it will avoid premature withdrawal.
▪ Regional order for cooperation – will be supported throughout the world, because the voluntary forms of regional government enable states and people to realize a wide range of interests: from security, culture and identity to the realization of influences in world relations;
▪ Global governance for the 21st century – the European Union is committed to a global order based on international law that ensures human freedoms, sustainable development and permanent access to global goods. This strategy is based on visions and ambitions for the creation of a stronger European Union with the will and ability to improve the position of its citizens as well as situations in the world.

2.2. Building resistance according to the strategy of the European Union from 2020

In 2020, the European Union adopted a new EU Security Union Strategy for the period 2020 to 2025, which provides guidance on strengthening security by preventing and detecting hybrid threats (See more: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-security-union-strategy.pdf).

Through this strategy, the European Union describes the tools and measures to ensure European security, both in the physical and digital worlds and across all sections of society, through the prevention and detection of hybrid threats.

The comprehensive approach of the European Union in dealing with hybrid threats, as well as the established cooperation between the European Union and NATO in the field of hybrid threats, (EU-NATO Joint Declaration -2016 and 2018 - cyber defense and capacity building, have been taken into account in the development of this national Strategy. Within NATO, in 2016, guidelines for building resilience were defined, as well as evaluation criteria to support the seven basic needs/requirements for building national resilience - Seven Baseline Requirements for National Resilience (see more about this https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoq/topics_132722.htm).

As a key component of the strategy, the Commission defines a new way forward in ensuring internal security with activities in key areas:
- Organized crime;
- Terrorism and prevention of violent radicalization;
- Durability of our critical infrastructure and public spaces;
- Cybercrime, including combating child sexual abuse;
- Cooperation in law enforcement and exchange of information;
- Research and innovation.

The proposal for a new strategy defines four priorities for action at the European Union level (Gerginova, 2022).

The first priority refers to the future security environment that focuses on protecting and increasing the resilience of key physical and digital infrastructure.

The second priority recognizes the problem of rapidly evolving threats and the need for the European Union to adapt to them in order to combat them. This primarily refers to the growing cybercrime and the need to improve the capacity of digital investigations, but also to combat hybrid threats aimed at disrupting social cohesion and trust in institutions.

The third priority is the fight against terrorism and organized crime. Regarding the fight against terrorism, the strategy emphasizes the importance of eliminating the causes of radicalization, prosecuting terrorists and foreign terrorist fighters and cooperating with non-EU countries and international organizations. As far as organized crime is concerned, the measures will focus on combating human trafficking, especially migrants, drug trafficking and illegal weapons.

The fourth priority refers to building a strong security ecosystem, which means cooperation and exchange of information, strong external borders, strengthening research capacities and improving skills and raising awareness of security issues.

2.3. Other activities of the European Union towards building resilience

The European Union defines critical infrastructure through Directive 2008/114/EC, which calls on member states to identify and design European critical infrastructure, as well as to assess the need to improve their protection. All Member States have implemented the Directive by establishing a process for identifying and designating critical European infrastructure in the energy and transport sectors. According to the Directive, critical infrastructure is defined as: "an asset, system or part thereof located in the Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital social functions, health, safety, economic or social well-being of the people and whose disruption or destruction would significant impact in the Member State as a result of failure to maintain those functions" (According to DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC – identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and assessment of the need to improve their protection available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= LEGISSUM%3Ajl0013).

In October 2012, the Commission presented its Communication 'The EU Approach to Resilience - Learning from Food Security Crises' to confirm its strong commitment to building resilience in crisis-prone countries (See more: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/EU_building_resilience_en.pdf)

Here we will the importance of the 'Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020' - operationalises the Communication and the plan sets the ways forward for a more effective EU collaborative action on building resilience, bringing together humanitarian action, long-term development cooperation and on-going political engagement.
This Action Plan sets out the European Union's approach to risk management and resilience, including initiatives for disaster risk, climate change adaptation, social protection, safety and food security. It will ensure that different sectors complement each other and work better together towards the common goals of reducing poverty and humanitarian aid to the European Union. The plan establishes strategic priorities. The resilience approach aims to reduce humanitarian needs and underpins more equitable and sustainable development gains. Planners and policymakers must do more to assess risk scenarios, reduce vulnerability and enhance the ability of individuals, communities and countries to absorb and recover from shocks – be it economic, political, ecological, climate-related, or triggered by natural hazards. It is emphasized that new ways of working, and more effective humanitarian-development collaboration in political dialogue. The plan also establishes priorities for the development and implementation of national capacities for resilience. Early priority in the action plan is given to vulnerable countries and regions where both EU humanitarian and development assistance are present. The aim is to develop shared assessments, strategies and implementation plans to build resilience.

During 2015, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Common Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats and Fostering the Resilience of the European Union, its Member States and Partner Countries, while increasing cooperation with NATO to counter these threats (See more: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1250_en.htm).

The Joint Framework offers a comprehensive approach to improve the common response to the challenges posed by hybrid threats to Member States, citizens and the collective security of Europe. It brings together all relevant actors, policies and instruments to both counter and mitigate the impact of hybrid threats in a more coordinated manner. In particular, it builds on the European Agenda on Security adopted by the Commission in April 2015, as well as on sectorial strategies such as EU Cyber Security Strategy, the Energy Security Strategy and the European Union Maritime Security Strategy. Together with the upcoming European Union Global Strategy for foreign and security policy and the Defense Action Plan, and ongoing work on capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD) in third countries, the Joint Framework is part of the strategy of the Commission and the High Representative to increase the EU's capacity as a security provider.

The Joint Framework brings together existing policies and proposes twenty-two operational Actions aimed at:

- raising awareness by establishing dedicated mechanisms for the exchange of information between Member States and by coordinating EU actions to deliver strategic communication;
- building resilience by addressing potential strategic and critical sectors such as cyber security, critical infrastructures (Energy, Transport, Space), protection of the financial system from illicit use, protection of public health, and supporting efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization;
- preventing, responding to crisis and recovering by defining effective procedures to follow, but also by examining the feasibility of applying the Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU) and the mutual defense clause (Art. 42(7) TEU), in case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs;
- stepping up the cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO as well as other partner organizations, in common efforts to counter hybrid threats, while
respecting the principles of inclusiveness and autonomy of each organization's decision-making process.

The Framework is designed to provide a robust foundation to support Member States in countering hybrid threats collectively, supported by a wide range of EU instruments and initiatives.

This document allows the European Union to be used as a platform to strengthen national efforts and through its regulatory capacity, to establish common benchmarks that can help raise the level of protection and resilience across the European Union. The main goal is for the European Union to act in the direction of improving collective situational awareness in building the resistance of the member states to hybrid threats and in preventing, reacting and recovering from the crisis.

During 2016, it faces new pressures such as population growth, urbanization, land and eco-systems’ degradation, the lack of natural resources, fragility of states and complex conflicts. Hence the need to build resilience. Resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long-term development (See more: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/EU_building_resilience_en.pdf).

Resilience can be built at various levels. Examples of building resilience are prevention and preparedness projects such as early warning systems or disaster insurance, which help local communities face the threats caused by hurricanes and violent storms during the rainy season or unpredictable events such as earthquakes. Resilience also encompasses assistance to countries so that they integrate risk management into their development programs and target these at building the capacities of the most vulnerable people.


The critical entities proposal itself reflects a shift from the current approach that focuses on protecting individual assets to strengthening the resilience of the critical entities that manage them. This proposal covers today’s real and complex aspects, taking into account: the wide range of risks, including natural hazards, state-sponsored hybrid actions, terrorism, insider threats, pandemics and industrial accidents; new technologies, such as 5G and drones; and an interconnected approach as hazards can generate cascading effects on service provision in other sectors and across borders.

An evaluation of the 2019 ECI Directive has been carried out, and it has been determined that existing European and national measures face limitations in helping operators face the operational challenges they face today and the vulnerabilities brought about by their interdependent nature (Overview of natural and man-made disaster risks the European Union may face (SWD (2020) 330).

With the New Directive - (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities, the use of a new term – critical entities is determined. (See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Directive - (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities, aims to maintain vital social functions, maintenance of economic activities throughout the Union and proper functioning of the internal market. They should be determined by the Directive harmonized minimum rules to ensure basic services in the internal market, to strengthen the resilience of critical entities and to improve cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. (According to DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2557 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (Text with EEA relevance))

This directive, defines certain terms such as: (‘critical entity’, ‘resilience’, ‘incident’, ‘critical infrastructure’, ‘risk assessment’ etc.). Each country should implement the Directive in its own national legislation and according to it should determine a strategy to improve the resilience of critical entities.

The directive establishes a comprehensive approach to the resilience of critical entities.

Each country should implement the Directive in its own national legislation and according to it should determine a strategy to improve the resilience of critical entities.

In order to ensure a comprehensive approach to the resilience of critical entities, each Member State should have a strategy for improving the resilience of critical entities ("strategy"). The strategy should set out the strategic objectives and policy measures to be implemented. When setting their strategies, Member States should take due account of the hybrid nature of threats to critical entities.

In order to achieve a comprehensive approach, Member States should ensure that their strategies provide a policy-making framework for enhanced coordination between competent authorities in the context of information sharing on cyber security risks, cyber threats and cyber incidents and non-cyber risks, threats and incidents and in the context of performing supervisory tasks.

By November 17, 2023, the Commission is expected to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 23 – a delegated act to supplement this Directive by establishing a non-exhaustive list of basic services in the sectors and sub-sectors listed in the Annex. This List of basic services will be used by the competent authorities to achieve the objectives of conducting a risk assessment until January 17, 2026.

Member States' risk assessments cover relevant natural and man-made risks, including those of a cross-sectoral or cross-border nature, accidents, natural disasters, public health emergencies and hybrid threats or other antagonistic threats, including terrorist offenses as envisaged for in Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
3. THE NATO APPROACH TO BUILDING RESILIENCE

The notion of the resilience of NATO member states through maintaining and developing their individual and collective defense capacity is rooted in the Alliance's 1949 Founding Treaty. This is, in particular, established in Article 3 where the internal dimension of resilience is implicitly defined in terms of capabilities and the capacity for collective defense is operationalized through NATO's defense planning and capability development process (See more: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm).

NATO defines resilience as “a society’s ability to resist and recover from such shocks” as natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack (According to “Resilience and Article 3”, NATO, 2021) or See more: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-NATO-HallSandeman.pdf).

This definition touches on two features of resilience: First, resilience concerns the ability to absorb and recover from a state of crisis. Second, resilient actors must be able to respond to a range of potential shocks, both expected and unexpected. This relates to the ability to survive; as one widely adopted definition of resilience puts it, an actor must be able “to maintain its core purpose … in the face of dramatically changed circumstances”.

Hence, each member state has an obligation to build resilience in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty – the obligation to collectively and individually develop capacities to respond to any form of threat or crisis that aims to threaten society and democratic values and to destabilize the functioning of state institutions.

The need for much broader political, economic, technological and societal resilience against hostile acts, began at the 2016 Warsaw Summit with the formulation of seven baseline requirements for national resilience and was followed by the 2020 Warfighting Capstone Concept, which argued that “layered resilience” would be one of the five “development imperatives” to ensure success in an era of persistent competition below the level of war.

At the 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO adopted a Strengthened Resilience Commitment, which established the principle that NATO would monitor and evaluate resilience policies adopted by member states, while recognizing that national resilience remains a matter for individual alliance members (“Brussels Summit Communiqué”, NATO, 2021).

The seven baseline goals of resilience, adopted at the 2016 Warsaw Summit and restated at the 2021 Brussels Summit, aim to ensure resilience in respect to: (According to “Warsaw Summit Communiqué”, NATO, 2016 or https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-NATO-HallSandeman.pdf)

- continuity of government and critical government services,
- energy supplies,
- uncontrolled movement of people,
- food and water,
- mass casualties,
- civil communications, and
- civil transportation.
NATO members made a number of further promises in 2021 to enhance resilience: securing and diversifying supply chains; protecting critical infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace) and key industries, including by shielding them from harmful economic activities; addressing the impact of emerging technologies; securing next-generation communications systems; and protecting technology and intellectual property (according to “Strengthened Resilience Commitment”, NATO, 2021).

Here as a policy recommendation, it is established that NATO can resolve the tension between its collective responsibility for resilience and the continuing national responsibility among member states for implementing resilience measures by addressing resilience in the framework of deterrence and defense. This aligns with the concept of deterrence used in the 2019 NATO Military Strategy and the 2020 Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, which focuses less on crisis response and more on how deterrence can be used in persistent competition (See more: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-NATO-HallSandeman.pdf).

The growing use of hostile measures short of war - which prompted the search for more sustained and wider resilience after 2014 - has increased the importance of deterrence by denial. Considering resilience within the context of deterrence will establish the overarching logic of NATO’s engagement with resilience issues and encourage the practicalities of moving towards “collective resilience”. As a form of deterrence, resilience policies will need to meet the three key criteria of all forms of deterrence: commitment, capability and communication (See more: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-NATO-HallSandeman.pdf).

The commitment to strengthening resilience, already significantly enhanced among member states after the Russian invasion of Crimea, has been greatly strengthened by the war in Ukraine. It will be important for NATO and its members to take advantage of the political capital created by these developments and the COVID-19 pandemic in enacting costly resilience measures. NATO should therefore focus on four aspects of resilience rather than the broader seven baseline requirements. These are: continuity in energy and essential supplies; the security of the digital realm to ensure key socioeconomic functions; maintaining the independence of critical technologies beyond the control of adversaries; and the ability to detect and dispel disinformation. In terms of capability, NATO should adopt a practical approach to helping the process of strengthening alliance wide resilience.

3.1. Nato activities according to the London declaration

The London Declaration, emerging from the NATO Leaders' Meeting on 3-4 December 2019, broadens the conceptual scope of resilience by including for the first time the societies of NATO member states, along with the resilience of critical infrastructure and energy security as secure and resilient systems to ensure the communications security of NATO countries (According to London Declaration, 2019).

According to the content of the London Declaration, NATO guarantees the security of the territory and the realization of the protection of European values such as democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law. Solidarity, unity and cohesion are the
basic principles of the Alliance. Today, NATO is an established collective defense and an essential forum for security consultation and decision-making among allies (see more: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm).

In accordance with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, NATO continues to strengthen individual and collective capacities to resist all forms of attack. Today, the NATO Alliance faces special threats and challenges arising from all strategic directions. Russia's aggressive actions pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a constant threat. The world is facing cyber and hybrid threats.

State and non-state actors challenge the rules-based international order. Instability across national borders also contributes to irregular migration. NATO is strengthening deterrence and defense capability with an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO is committed to preserving and strengthening effective arms control. Disarmament and non-proliferation, taking into account the prevailing security environment. Allies are strongly committed to the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

NATO strengthens partnership in the neighborhood and beyond, deepening political dialogue, support and engagement with partner countries and international organizations. NATO increases cooperation with the United Nations; there is unprecedented progress in NATO - European Union cooperation. NATO has an Open Door policy and this strengthens the Alliance.

NATO undertakes activities aimed at increasing the resilience of national societies and increases energy security. NATO and Allies, within their respective mandates, are committed to ensuring the security of communications, including 5G, recognizing the need to rely on secure and resilient systems. NATO is increasing its tools to respond to cyber attacks and strengthening its ability to prepare, deter and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine European security and national societies.

NATO also undertakes activities in the direction of preserving human security. This declaration also emphasizes the need to strengthen the political dimension of NATO, including consultations. The strength of NATO's Resilience Agenda lies in the area of civilian preparedness, which comes as a necessity of the rapidly changing security environment and the strengthened defense and deterrence posture of the Alliance in view of the increased terrorist and hybrid threats targeting the civilian population and critical infrastructure of the Euro-Atlantic territory.

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allied leaders decided to improve NATO's resilience across the spectrum of threats and agreed on seven core national resilience requirements against which member states can measure their level of readiness. These are: guaranteeing continuity in the work of government and critical government services; resilience of energy suppliers; the ability to effectively deal with the uncontrolled movement of people; resilient food and water resources; ability to deal with mass casualties; resilient civilian communications systems; and resilient civil transportation systems.

Resilience thinking cannot exist in isolation from the capacity of international organizations and national governments to anticipate which of the wide spectrum of risks and vulnerabilities will pose a security challenge at one point or another and accordingly prepare mechanisms for coping, managing consequences and mitigation strategies.

According to NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture is based on a combination of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities,
complemented by space and cyber capabilities. NATO, under this concept, is committed to using military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated manner to be able to respond to all threats to national and global security. NATO's action is defensive, proportionate and fully in line with international obligations. Proportionate to the threats it faces, NATO establishes deterrence and defensive action that will be credible, flexible, adaptive and sustainable.

Through the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO continues with a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide national resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to global security, as a national responsibility and collective obligation rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Furthermore, NATO continues to invest in the ability to prepare for and defend against the coercive use of political, energy information and other hybrid tactics by states and non-state actors.

Hybrid operations against allies could reach the level of an armed attack and could prompt the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO will continue to support its partners to counter hybrid challenges and will seek to maximize synergy with other relevant actors, such as the European Union.

Human security, as well as the protection of civilians and the mitigation of civilian harm, are fundamental objectives in NATO's approach to crisis prevention and management. Today, NATO works with other international actors to address the broader conditions that fuel crises and instability and to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction. NATO is strengthening coordination and cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union, as well as with other regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the African Union.

4. CONCLUSION

All activities of the European Union are aimed at establishing a comprehensive approach to the resilience of critical entities as a top national priority. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities, establishes a comprehensive approach to the resilience of critical entities. Each country should implement the Directive in its own national legislation and in accordance with it should determine a strategy for improving the resilience of critical entities. In determining the strategy, the country should take into account the hybrid nature of threats to critical entities. Also, the strategy should set the strategic objectives and policy measures to be implemented. In the interest of achieving coherence and efficiency, the strategy should be designed to seamlessly integrate existing policies. These policies need to build on relevant existing national and sectoral strategies, plans or similar documents.

In the final part, the author states several conclusions: resilience of NATO member states through maintaining and developing their individual and collective defense capacity - collective defense capacity is operationalized through NATO's defense planning and capability development process; the conceptual scope of resilience is expanded to include the resilience of critical infrastructure and energy security as well as secure and resilient systems for ensuring the communication security of NATO countries; it should be a multifaceted strategy and a broad systemic perspective aimed at configuring the multiple risks of crises and at the same time improving the mechanisms for rapid involvement and adaptation of reactions, national and regional level; in relation to prevention, a resilience-
based approach is needed which would identify and reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the effects of potential threats and which highlights the importance of the capabilities of actors implementing response and recovery actions and helps to smoother adaptation to a new situation and environment after the crisis. It is necessary to create a common awareness of the nature of hybrid threats, mapping the responsibilities and the bearers, identifying the ways of acting, as well as creating resources for building national resilience (capacity to quickly deal with harmful consequences), by engaging the entire society (whole-of-society approach). It also implies the construction of a society prepared for early detection, response and rapid healing with the participation of all relevant stakeholders.

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