HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN WARFARE

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Abstract

The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century had a profound effect on the way the wars were fought. Historians often refer to the American Civil War (1861-65) as the first genuine modern war. History has shown that the effects of technological advances in industry are processes which follow the revolution in the history of war. Napoleon's military campaigns formed the basis of formal military education and leadership in the Western world. Wars as a social phenomenon were more effective through the use of the first modern railways, roads, and warships, which in most military operations changed the doctrine and tactics of warfare and the deployment of military forces on the battlefield.

The first and second generation of modern warfare was dominated by the massive use of military force, and numerous armies. This generation of warfare culminates in the Renaissance with the wars of the French emperor and one of the most famous strategic military leaders of that time, Napoleon Bonaparte.

The third generation of warfare was a product of the First World War and was generally developed by the German army and is better known as “Blitzkrieg” or maneuver warfare. The strategic military leader in this generation of warfare was Adolph Hitler.

The fourth generation of warfare is an evolved form of rebellion that uses all available networks: political, economic, social, and military, in order to create an imaginary image of the adversary. Also, the fifth generation of warfare is defined as contactless warfare, which states and destroys a specific goal without the physical presence of a human. This generation of warfare begins with long-range artillery and naval firearms and long-range missile systems and has been studied since the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Strategic leadership in the fourth and fifth generation of warfare have been most developed by US military strategic leaders especially after the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. World-class warriors are strategic leaders who have moved beyond tactical and operational competence in the employment of the future force. They understand and implement a full spectrum of operations at the strategic level to include theater and campaign strategy, joint force, interagency in multinational operations. At the end, the military strategic leaders are using all spectrum of military elements of national political
power and technology in the execution of the national security strategy. The aim of this paper is to analyze the historical development of strategic leadership in warfare throughout history, taking into account the comprehensive social changes that have taken place in the world over the last two centuries.

**Keywords:** historical development, strategic leadership, generations of warfare, strategy, tactics

1. **INTRODUCTION**

The history of warfare is constantly changing and evolving. This is due to the usual factors that have always influenced war: changes in the international relations, shifting the center of power to regional and global levels, new political processes, technologies and weapons. Soldiers have a basic obligation to engage in warfare, and they are obliged to develop military doctrine and change their organization in order to achieve the goal of their existence - to defeat the enemy in war. In the last decade, the term "hybrid security threats" has become increasingly common, replacing the term "asymmetric security threats". For the past two decades, the term "asymmetry" has been used to describe unpredictable security threats that vary in intensity, the proportionality of military forces versus non-state actors, the usual methods, tactics and procedures, and the weapons they use. The history of warfare is constantly changing and evolving. This is due to the usual factors that have always influenced war: changes in international relations, shifting the center of power to regional and global levels, new political processes, technologies and weapons. Soldiers have a basic obligation to engage in warfare, and they are obliged to develop military doctrine and change their organization in order to achieve the goal of their existence - to defeat the enemy in war. In the last decade, the term "hybrid security threats" has become increasingly common, replacing the term "asymmetric security threats". For the past two decades, the term "asymmetry" has been used to describe unpredictable security threats that vary in intensity, the proportionality of military forces versus non-state actors, the usual methods, tactics and procedures, and the weapons they use. Politicians around the world have used the term to justify defense unpreparedness in the face of unpredictable security threats. But, in essence, the concept of asymmetry in war is nothing new and has existed since the time of war.

An asymmetric conflict is a clash between two disproportionate forces, i.e., opponents who are different in number, equipment, weapons and the method of warfare. Characteristic of an asymmetric conflict is that the stronger does not mean that he will win, because the weaker can use his weaknesses against him, metaphorically explained by the example of the fight between David and Goliath.

Strategic leaders guide the achievement and vision of their organization with a larger enterprise by directing policy and strategy, building consensus, allocating resources, organizational culture and shaping complex and ambiguous external environments. They lead by example to build effective organizations, grow the next generation of strategic leaders, energize subordinates, seek opportunities to achieve organizational goals and balance personal and professional demands1. As to the armed conflicts that occur today, if we analyze them through the prism of terrorists as non-state

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actors, have an initial advantage because they are not subject to any rules of the game, while the organized national military forces continue to limit their capabilities, including methods of counter terrorism. Information technology, economy and fast transfer of information are tools for state actors, but on the other hand they are also a potential in the hands of non-state actors (terrorist networks, organizations and groups), allowing them to increase the intensity of their power and easily achieve their goals.

2. INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN WARFARE

The industrial revolution significantly improved the conditions under which the war was waged with improving communication systems, transport, infrastructure and the overall modernization of weapons used in military operations. The American Civil War (1861-1865) drastically changed the traditional way of warfare, through the introduction and use of new, more modern weapons and the continuous advancement of the technological development of the military industry. At the beginning of the XIX century or more precisely in the period from 1815 to 1848, on a regional and global level, the world was followed by a period of peace, i.e., a period of conflicts and crises of low intensity in certain world regions, so that in historical science this period is known as the three-decade peace. In this period Europe was followed by a remarkable expansion of the industrial revolution and improvement of the road and railway infrastructure and above all, the vessels, i.e., various types of boats, transport ships and submarines, so that in this time period, the development and modernization of armaments were generally neglected because world peace was supposed to last for a long time.

The development of the railway traffic infrastructure brought another revolutionary changes. The effects of the development of the railway infrastructure on the conduct of the wars at the outset, changes that would still serve their main purpose were expected. During the second half of the 19th century, the growing intensity of rivalry and conflicts led to the following wars at the local and regional levels: the Crimean War (1853-1856), the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Russian-Turkish War of 1877 and the American-Spanish War (1898-1901).

Armies have been growing in number and continuity, and with the development of weapons, transport and communication systems, they have become more mobile and efficient than before. The firepower of modern weapons has been effective, especially in terms of combat power, accuracy and range. Numerous models and types of more modern weapons were produced: ammunition, rifles, cannons, etc. Scientific discoveries and rapid technical and technological development were particularly stimulated with the needs for the advancement of the military industry. The new discoveries led to the creation of a new

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strategy and doctrine of warfare, less dependent on the physical ability of the manpower or soldiers, and more dependent on the technical capabilities. A modern and continuous development of military technology became the basis for the development of military thought and the initial, i.e., key goal in the rapid changes of military conservatism.

The Prussian army used railway transport primarily for the rapid transport of military equipment and other logistics needed to supply the army with timely supplies of food, ammunition, armaments, equipment, and so on. This tendency of the Prussian army over time proved to be a "grandiose strategy" for winning military campaigns. The continuous physical readiness of the Prussian soldiers was done by perfecting the tactical methods introduced at the end of the XVIII century by the French Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769-1821), in which the first place was devoted to military history, military tactics and strategy, military morale and ethics, perseverance in military training, praise for soldiers who have shown above-average results, and disciplinary sanctions for soldiers who have repeatedly made the same mistake. No other army at that time had the equivalent of the Prussian Military College and the General Staff, organizations created by studying the application of theoretical and practical instructional knowledge in the implementation of the knowledge gained on the battlefields.

In the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Americans learned the difficult lessons of modern warfare, i.e., they had a "practical implementation of the lessons learned" through the cruel way of five years of hardship. In his book War and the Rise of the State, historian Bruce Porter writes: “At the outset, industrialization was a secondary phenomenon, a deep foam on the surface of deeply rooted traditional societies that found it difficult to accept change.

Modern weapons of destruction were presented through several types of machine guns that were very naively perceived by European peoples. At the beginning of the American Civil War, there was a doctrine of obsolete warfare. Old war lessons had to be rewritten by American generals during the Civil War. With this, the way of warfare began to change. Old tactics and training were ineffective due to modern weapons. The American Civil War was an event that revolutionized the evolution of war. US military minds rewrote military strategy to cover all aspects of modern technology. In the twentieth century, successful strategic leaders were like the titans of industry, managing increasingly large enterprises and increasingly complex endeavors. Winning often meant bringing the most resources to bear at the appropriate time and place. Particularly in the American way of war, logistics were decisive. But future strategic leaders will need to be more like cutting-edge entrepreneurs, out-innovating and out-adapting adversaries. Defeating the armed forces of enemies may be necessary but not sufficient as future strategic leaders struggle to sustain security in an interconnected environment, where destroying and destabilizing are easy but sustaining security, hard. Building an organizational culture that is both effective and ethical will be challenging and the success - short-lived. The process of reinvention and innovation will be constant. What works today, whether an organization, an ethic, a process, or a concept, may not work tomorrow.

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9 Bruce D. Porter. War and the rise of the state, USA, 1994, 105-110.
Strategic leaders simultaneously sustain culture, envision the future, convey that vision to a wide audience, and personally lead the changes\textsuperscript{12}.

The concept of Army Leadership Framework was defined in three levels of Army leadership:

\textit{Direct Leadership}, which is primarily influencing and interpersonal in nature, i.e., leadership by an individual and small group, task-oriented perspective. The three words used to describe it were “cohesion, procedures, and motivation.” These are leaders who get things done.

\textit{Organizational Leadership} which is predominantly operating and maintaining in nature; these leaders deal with leadership from an organizational systems and processes. Climate, policies and direction which defines the focus of this leadership. These are leaders who focus inward on the organization and make sure things are working.

\textit{Strategic Leadership} is always focused on improving and building in nature, these leaders primarily look outward, dealing with global/regional and national issues. Their work is creating, confirming and generating commitment on culture, values, purpose and is defined by the acronym, VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity). Strategic leaders are constantly focusing on how to navigate a VUCA environment\textsuperscript{13}.

\textsuperscript{12} USA Department of Army. Army Leadership and profession ADP 6-22, USA Army, 2019, 7-1.
\textsuperscript{13} Hüseyin Ciçeklioğlu. VUCA concept and leadership, journal of Management and strategy, Istanbul, 2020, 229-235.
3. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN GENERATION OF WARFARE

The first generation of warfare began to develop more seriously in the early second half of the seventeenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century. Regarding the tactics of deployment of the military forces on the front, they were deployed in battle lines and columns, in order to create military discipline, organization and coordination of the combat deployment. A strictly defined combat schedule of the military forces begins to lose its primary significance in the era of advanced technical industrialization, when the basic imperative and importance are placed on the development of modern armaments with great and destructive firepower\(^\text{14}\).

This generation of warfare bases its warfare tactics on a symmetrical order of rows and columns and their arrangement on the battlefield with strictly defined military rules, norms, and doctrines established during 1648. The above-mentioned principles of warfare in the first generation were applied until the end of the Crimean War (1853-1856) or more specifically until 1860\(^\text{15}\). The relevance of the first generation of warfare stems from the fact that the battlefield had a frontal deployment of opposing military sides.

The second generation of warfare is a response to the contradiction between the established frontal order of the opposing military forces and the conditions of warfare established by the military environment. It was originally developed by the French army during and after World War I. The Second Generation War seeks a solution in massive firepower, through indirect artillery fire. The goal was to attract firepower and capabilities. Centrally controlled firepower was carefully synchronized (using detailed, specific plans and orders) for infantry, tanks, and artillery in a battle where the commander was in fact conducting an orchestra. The second generation of warfare came as a great relief to the soldiers. The focus was on the rules and procedures. According to strategic military leaders, obedience was more important than incentive. In fact, no incentive was needed to jeopardize synchronization.

The third generation of warfare is a product of the First World War, i.e., it was developed by the German army and is better known as blitzkrieg war or maneuver warfare. The war in the third generation was not based on firepower, but on speed, surprise and mental, as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack, the third-generation army tries to enter the enemy's rear areas and knock them down from behind. Instead of "shutting down and destroying", the motto is "bypassing and destroying". In defense, they tries to attract the enemy and then neutralize him. War ceases to be a match in which the forces try to keep or advance in line. The third generation of warfare was non-linear\(^\text{16}\). The tactics in the third generation of wars have changed and focus outside, on the situation, on the enemy and on the outcome that the situation demands, not internally, on the method. According to strategic military leaders, initiative is more important than obedience.

The fourth generation of war is a war characterized by the blurring of lines between war and politics, fighters and civilians. The term was first used in 1980 by a team of US military experts, analysts and professors. This generation of wars is becoming popular due to the upheavals in the Iraq war and global terrorist attacks\(^\text{17}\).

\(^{15}\) Edgerton Robert B. Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War, 1999, 35-40.
Evolutionary development of the history of warfare as a fundamental fact for the further development of national strategy of the great powers and their national military doctrines was recently based on the following generations of warfare:

1. The first generation of warfare, the basic was tactical-operational methods and focus on using massive or numerous military force.

2. The second generation of warfare had the basic goal of using a large firepower in addition to numerous military forces.

3. The third generation of warfare was focused on development of maneuver to perfection and improvement of tactical methods and procedures for the most successful possible implementation of effective offensive and defensive combat actions.

4. The fourth generation of warfare is an evolved form of rebellion which uses all available networks: political, economic, social, and military, in order to create an imaginary image of the adversary that opposing this type of warfare, regardless of using modern military technology which is a "failed mission" for neutralizing this generation of warlords, represent an unconventional war that can be called an "evolved form of rebellion" or rebellion. The use of non-linear tactics of warfare makes this type of warfare hard to define specific battlefields or fronts between the opposing sides. The term fourth-generation warfare appeared in the late 1980s, and for the strategic military leaders was a "kind of enigma" because this type of warfare deviated from the traditional principle of warfare and is a non-traditional way of warfare.

The cornerstone of the critical analysis of this type of warfare were the terrorist attacks carried out in the United States on 11th September 2001. All of this was analyzed through the effects that al-Qaeda had on the United States, demolition of the Twin Towers and the consequences of this terrorist act by al-Qaeda.

The fourth generation of warfare would be defined as a vague distinction between war and peace, achieving the effect of continuous tension and stress of the country citizens on which this war is being waged. The fourth generation of warfare is a non-linear war, which does not usually have a clearly defined front of action. The fourth generation of warfare is characterized with long wars which can last for decades, compared to the previous three generations of warfare, which by their nature were conventional wars that have a certain time interval and end with defeat or victory.

The fifth generation of warfare is defined as contactless warfare, which destroys a specific goal without a physical presence of man. This generation of warfare begins with long-range artillery and naval firearms and long-range missile systems and was studied from the US terrorist attacks from September 11th 2001. The United States was the first to confront the fifth generation, so that a dilemma evolved among military professors and strategic military leaders not only in dealing with the war, but at the same time for strategies that

look beyond military readiness for past wars and accept the perspective of national preparedness for the spectrum of future conflicts.\textsuperscript{24}

Previous scientific research on the fifth generation of warfare shows that it has evolved, pointing to: a very rapid and sophisticated penetration of cyber-attacks into military classifications "state secret", attacks with biological weapons, anthrax which was sent through letters to the US President during 2003/04, Madrid bombings in 2004 and the rise of al-Qaeda.

In the NATO military doctrine, hybrid warfare is characterized as a spectrum of irregular and cyber warfare.\textsuperscript{25} On the other hand, unconventional warfare is defined as: special operations in the fight against guerrillas in a certain area.\textsuperscript{26} Here, we should notice that part or all of the national special units are trained and equipped to be able to successfully deal with "guerrilla warfare", subversion, sabotage, illegal intelligence activities and other unconventional activities.\textsuperscript{27}

While conventional warfare means a war between national military forces, unconventional warfare as a form of warfare reflects a war of conventional forces with irregular (rebel, terrorist, irregular, illegitimate forces).\textsuperscript{28} Unconventional warfare is one of the vital segments of irregular warfare. On the other hand, irregular warfare is a part of modern hybrid warfare. So, it is more than clear that hybrid warfare is modern warfare than unconventional warfare.\textsuperscript{29}

With the advent of ISIS in 2004/05, their cells action matrix also changed. In parallel with the announcement of the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and NATO Opponents, through the grandiose DIME strategy, ISIS has applied and is implementing the same in its grandiose strategy to attack so-called "soft" and "hard" targets in line with military diplomacy American historian and diplomat Joseph Ney. In the "hard goals" according to the strategy of ISIS is their spread or territorial expansion. Soft targets are vital critical infrastructure: bridges, tunnels, airports, government buildings, shopping malls, hospitals, and other facilities where crowds are large and explosions are causing major effects.

Hybrid warfare is a fifth generation warfare. Unlike the unconventional warfare, where the "center of gravity" of forces can be determined during combat operations in hybrid warfare "center of gravity" is unpredictable because the main attacks are carried out by intrusion, destruction and destabilization of strategic information systems that contain data on the political, military, economic and other capacities of a country exposed to a hybrid war. The strategy for modern types of warfare, such as hybrid warfare, are very often elaborated through involvement of these instruments of power: diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ralph Peters. New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy, New York, 2005, 10-12.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson. Hybrid Warfare, JSOU Report 13-4 August 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{26} FM 3-05.201, (S/NF) Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (U) 28 September 2007, 22-24.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing, Literature Publishing House, 1999, 7-8.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Donald J. Reed, Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31:8, 2008, 683–687.
\end{itemize}
4. CONCLUSION

In the new generation of wars, the distinction between "civilians" and "soldiers" disappears. It is a combined approach of political, social, military and economic means in order to defeat the opponent. It can be implemented by states, transnational or non-state organizations and actors\(^3^1\). The psychological impact of battle and the prospect of future battle have a tremendous influence upon the performance of individuals and of the units in which they are members. Individuals and units can minimize the adverse effects of facing and participating in sustained combat by being properly conditioned, supported, and trained. Unfortunately, the costs of creating and sustaining the institutional processes necessary to conserve the psychological capacity of our Army to function effectively in battle often have little perceived value in training of the forces in peacetime\(^3^2\).

Achieving an understanding of the human dimension of combat is a continuing professional commitment of any Army leader, but above all, the leader at the strategic level. It is a subject area that is as rich and complex as any quest for understanding of human nature. As such, it encompasses such diverse topics as: the value system of a society and its military; how individual values are influenced or changed; the psychological and physical manifestations of combat stress; the influences of training and conditioning to prevent or ameliorate the stress of combat; the dynamics of unit performance and cohesion, and other related topics. In the best of all worlds, leaders will achieve the strategic level without personal experience in the human dimension of combat. After ten years of conflict in the Middle East this lofty goal is clearly not realistic now or in near future. Regardless of whether they have personally experienced the stress of combat, strategic leaders must possess a fundamental appreciation for this dimension of warfare for the very reason that our Army must always be prepared to commit its forces to combat to protect our nation’s interests. Every decision that Army strategic leaders make, now or in the future, must be made with consideration of the impact of that decision on the psychological staying power of our soldiers and units in battle. To permit our Army to lessen the proper focus on psychological readiness for sustained combat is to break faith with those soldiers who will commit themselves in current and future conflicts\(^3^3\).

The future military force will need strategic leaders which take responsibility for the Army as a profession. Leaders with professional astuteness get the mission accomplished, but they also have the insight to do what is best for the profession and nation. This may include having political influences, knowing when to compromise or understanding the many constituents that the Army serves. Additionally, strategic leaders with professional astuteness seek to ensure the officer corps maintains its expertise in national defense as well as adhering to a professional ethic. Professional astuteness is a strategic leadership competency that ensures that the Army deliberately takes steps to ensure the Army remains a profession, not merely a job,

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\(^3^3\) Army News Service, “General Casey Lauds ‘Comprehensive Soldier Fitness’ Progress, 2010.
organization, bureaucracy or occupation\textsuperscript{34}. Future strategic leaders will be dependable on artificial intelligence, particularly in a decision-making process in armed conflicts\textsuperscript{35}. Future strategic leaders will also face immense ethical challenges deciding how to use new technology like artificial intelligence and the human-technology interface. Even now, technology will raise difficult and complex ethical issues for the military. These challenges will affect the use of technology by the military, particularly the integration of humans and technology. And the more human-enhancement technology proliferates and matures, the greater the political resistance to it will become. Strategic leaders will have to navigate this complexity\textsuperscript{36}.

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